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ABSTRACT 
In an increasingly digitalised world, this article deals with peer-to-
peer (P2P) lending as a new online source of financing, which differs 
from e.g. financing in traditional banks. The article elaborates on the 
following questions: How should P2P lending be put in the context of 
the existing legislation? Is the existing legislation sufficient to meet the 
impact that P2P lending may have on modern society? Or is new special 
legislation necessary? Lenders can be both individuals and companies, 
but the main focus of this article is on individuals. It includes the 
European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on European 
Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for Business 
(COM/2018/0113 final) and parallels are drawn to syndicated loans 
known from banking. How P2P lending fits into the existing legal 
framework in regard to banks, payment services, money laundering and 
terrorist financing, consumer credit, investor protection etc. is still veiled 
in some uncertainty. The most remarkable example of the legal 
implications is the case of TrustBuddy AB. On 23 June 2014, the Danish 
financial supervisory authority (FSA) decided that the P2P 
platform, TrustBuddy AB, needed to be licensed as a bank. The FSA 
concluded that TrustBuddy AB was not a credit intermediary and in 
reality, the lenders were investors. To create a sound business and to 
promote an EU market for P2P lending, a further clarification and 
adjustment of the existing legislation may yet be needed; especially since 
there are still several legal challenges in regard to private individuals 
being peers. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital innovation has opened up new possibilities for non-
traditional players and the growth of the online alternative finance 
market. One of the most important examples of how new business 
models based on financial technology (Fin-Tech) emerge, is the 
crowdfunding movement. As a major part of this movement, 
‘crowdlending’ – known as peer-to-peer (P2P) lending – has spread 
throughout Europe, including the Nordic countries. The development 
has been fuelled by the global financial crisis, which both has eroded 
consumers’ trust in banks and made consumer loans less attractive for 
banks by increased regulatory oversight and capital requirements, and 
historically low interest rates induce investors to look for alternative 
sources of profit.1  
The first P2P lending emerged in 2005, but especially in the last 
five years the numbers have increased.2 In Europe, P2P lending counts 
                                                        
1 Christoph Busch and Vanessa Mak, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in the European Union’ 
[2016] 4 EuCML 181, 181. 
2 The platform Zopa is known for being the world’s first P2P lender, when it was 
launched in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2005, see AltFi Opinion, ‘The world’s 
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for more than 50% of the online alternative finance market, where the 
volume in 2016 reached €7,671m (2013: €1,127m; 2015: €5,431m).3 Yet 
P2P lending still only constitutes a tiny fraction of the overall lending 
market; for example the German market for consumer lending alone has 
a volume of about €175,000m, and in the UK the percentage market 
share might be around 2-3%.4 Thus, the potential for further growth 
seems considerable – especially taking the significant increase of P2P 
lending in recent years into account. 
In 2016, the European online alternative finance market – excluding the 
UK – grew by 101% reaching €2,063m; the average annual growth was 
85% in 2013-2015. The top three national EU markets for online 
alternative finance by market volume are France (€443.98m), Germany 
(€321.84m) and the Netherlands (€194.19m). However, the markets of 
Finland (€142.23m), Spain (€130.90m), Italy (€127.06m) and Georgia 
(€102.58m) experienced a boom in 2016. Also, the Nordics are 
exhibiting rapid regional growth. When reviewed together, they 
(Denmark (€88m), Finland (€142m), Iceland, (€1m), Norway (€4.9m) 
and Sweden (€86.5m)) account for over €322m.5 The UK remains the 
largest individual market in Europe, even though the market share has 
declined from 81% in 2015 to 73% in 2016 (€5,608m).  
 As digital intermediaries, P2P lending platforms are online ‘credit 
marketplaces’ which promote the contact between borrowers and 
lenders. Though there is not a fixed definition of P2P lending, in this 
article the term is used for the matching of investors (lenders) and 
project owners (borrowers) through the use of an electronic information 
system (the platform) managed by a service provider, which as a legal 
person facilitates the granting of loans. In a limited interpretation, P2P 
lending only covers private individuals lending to one-another. However, 
the most common use also includes businesses as peers; for example 
‘private individual’-to-business. Since P2P platforms often have 
specialized in a certain type of borrower, they reflect this. However, the 
platforms’ business models may be defined in other ways, as for example 
by loans secured against a property. 
P2P business lending – understood as individuals or institutional 
funders that provide a loan to a business borrower – in 2016 represented 
                                                                                                              
original P2P lender has announced a governance restructuring ahead of the hotly-
anticipated launch of its bank’: http://www.altfi.com/article/4284_zopa-creates-
separate-board-for-neo-bank-hires-four-new-neds. All the web pages in this article are 
latest retrieved 31 May 2018. 
3 Tania Ziegler et al., Expanding Horizons: The 3rd European Alternative Finance Industry 
Report (University of Cambridge, 2018) 16 and 20-29. The report covers 14 different 
alternative finance models and by estimate 90% of the visible alternative finance market 
in Europe.  
4 Moritz Renner, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in Germany’ [2016] 5 EuCML 224 and Rainer 
Lenz, ‘Peer-to-Peer Lending: Opportunities’ and Risks’ [2016] 4 EJRR 688, 690. 
5 Ziegler (n 3) 16, 20-29 and 75. 
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17.0% (€ 349.96m) of European alternative finance volume. In the 
Nordics, the P2P business lending sector grew from 2015 to 2016 by 
97% to €55m representing 17% of regional volume. Finland has the 
largest share by 86% (€47m) and is only followed by Denmark 14% 
(€8m) and Sweden, where less than 1% (€0.1m) is reported.6 The top 
three national EU markets are the Netherlands (€124m), France (€71m) 
and Finland (€48m).7 
In P2P Business Lending the main focus is to promote credit to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Examples of platforms are 
the Danish Flex Funding, Kreditmatch and Lendino (since 2013-14). 
The rationale is often that entrepreneurs may have difficulties raising 
loans in the banks. The European Commission’s proposal for a 
Regulation on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for 
Business (hereafter the proposal) from 8 March 2018 especially focuses 
on the challenges that small and nascent firms have, particularly when 
they move from the start-up phase into the expansion phase where 
access to bank financing often is scarce, see the proposal Preamble 2.8 
P2P lending is thus found to represent one of the latest forms of 
financing that works towards so-called ‘financial inclusion’.9 It is part of 
the Commission’s priority of establishing a Capital Market Union 
(CMU), which aims to broaden access to finance for innovative 
companies, start-ups and other unlisted firms.10  
P2P consumer lending – understood as individuals or institutional 
funders who provide a loan to a consumer borrower – in 2016 
represented 33.8% (€696.81m) of European alternative finance volume 
and thereby has the largest market share. In the Nordics, the P2P 
consumer lending market has been recovering from the bankruptcy of 
the major platform TrustBuddy AB in 2015 and therefore barely 
represents 21% of regional alternative finance volumes. In 2016 the 
volumes were approximately €67m and grew by 83% from 2015. Finland 
has the largest share by 93% (€62m) and is only followed by Sweden, 
                                                        
6 Ziegler (n 3) 75-78. 
7 Ibid 31. 
8 COM/2018/0113 final – 2018/048 (COD). The proposal is included in a package of 
measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union (also) from 8 March 2018, together with the 
Communication ‘Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate 
delivery’. 
9 For a critical investigation of the ambiguous social outcomes, see Chris Rogers and 
Chris Clarke, ‘Mainstreaming social finance: The regulation of the peer-to-peer lending 
marketplace in the United Kingdom’ [2016] 18(4) BJPIR 930. 
10 The ‘CMU should create an appropriate regulatory environment that enhances cross-
border access to information on the companies looking for credit, quasi-equity and 
equity structures, in order to promote growth of non-bank financing models, including 
crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending’; see European Parliament resolution of 9 July 
2015 on Building a Capital Markets Union (2015/2634(RSP)), par. 47. 
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where 7% (€5m) is reported.11 The top three national EU markets are 
Germany (€181m), France (€179m) and Georgia (€103m).12 Examples of 
P2P platforms that promote credits to consumers around the world are: 
Auxmoney (Germany; since 2007), Better Rates (Denmark; since 2015), 
Kokos.pl (Poland; since 2008), Lendico (Germany – also operates in 
Austria, Brazil, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, and Spain; since 
2013), Lending Club (United States (US); since 2006), LendInvest (UK; 
since 2008), RateSetter (UK; since 2010), ViaInvest (Latvia – also 
operates in Czech, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden; since 2008), 
Smava (Germany; since 2007) and Zopa (UK; since 2005).  
The proposal exempts among others in Art. 2(2)(a) crowdfunding 
services that are provided to project owners that are consumers, as 
defined in the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(a).13 They are 
considered better protected in this directive, see 2.2.3 below. 
Furthermore, the proposal exempts in Art. 2(2)(d) crowdfunding offers 
with a consideration of more than €1m per crowdfunding offer, which 
shall be calculated over a period of 12 months in regard to a particular 
crowdfunding project. Eventhough the consumer terminology is not 
used in regard to investment, the proposal will apply to private 
individuals as investors (lenders). 
P2P loans are mainly unsecured. However, P2P property lending – 
understood as individuals or institutional funders that provide a loan 
secured against a property to a consumer or business borrower – counts 
4.6% (€ 95.15m) of European alternative finance volume. The top three 
national EU markets are Denmark (€55m), Estonia (€31m) and Latvia 
(€5m). It is seemingly absent in the Nordic countries, except from 
Denmark and Sweden (€1m).14 An example of such a P2P platform is the 
Danish UdenomBanken via the company Reel Finans Pantebrevsselskab 
A/S (since 2014). Furthermore, there are other ways in which loans can 
be secured. For example Auxmoney has, since 2010, allowed a security 
assignment of cars in car loans.15 There is no statistical material found in 
regard to other secured loans.  
This article deals with P2P lending as a new source of financing 
compared to e.g. financing in traditional banks. It will elaborate on the 
following questions: How should P2P lending be put in the context of 
the existing legislation? Is the existing legislation sufficient to meet the 
impact that P2P lending may have on modern society? Or is new special 
                                                        
11 Ziegler (n 3) 75-78. 
12 Ibid 31. 
13 European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/48/EC of 26 June 2013 of 
23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 
87/102/EEC [2008] OJ L 133/66. 
14 Ziegler (n 3) 31. 
15 Renner (n 4) 224 and Christian Berger and Bernd Skiera, ‘Elektronische 
Kreditmarktplätze: Funktionsweise, Gestaltung und Erkenntnisstand bei dieser Form 
des "Peer-to- Peer Lending"’ [2012] 45 Kredit und Kapital, 289, 291. 
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legislation necessary? The peers can be both private individuals (natural 
persons as consumers) and businesses (legal persons), but the main focus 
of the article will be on individuals. Tax law is not included in this article, 
but also creates some challenges for the P2P platforms. 
2. LEGAL CHALLENGES – A NEW DIGITAL INTERMEDIARY 
PLATFORM 
How P2P lending fits into the existing legal framework in regard to 
banks, payment services, money laundering and terrorist financing, 
consumer credit, investor protection etc. is still veiled in some 
uncertainty. The answers are more clear in some legal areas than others, 
and mainly depend on how the platform is set up and in which country it 
operates in. Despite of the forthcoming EU regulation as set out in the 
proposal, which creates some clarification, legal challenges still surround 
P2P lending. The most remarkable example of the multifaceted legal 
implications is the case of TrustBuddy AB. On 23 June 2014, the Danish 
FSA decided that a) the P2P platform TrustBuddy AB needed to be 
licensed as a bank. The FSA concluded that it was not a credit 
intermediation, and the lenders were in reality investors. Among others, 
the FSA also b) found the validity of the contracts doubtful, where 
TrustBuddy AB got unrestricted rights and monitoring possibilities, but 
the credit risk still was the investors. The case furthermore underlines c) 
that it is important to make sure that the digital platform is set up in the 
correct manner to obtain the benefits of the new digital possibilities for 
financing. Litra a) above both relates to public law and the so-called 
outer layer of legislation that constitutes the conditions under which the 
platform and its users can operate, see 2.1 below. Litra b) above relates 
to private law and the layer of legislation that regulates the relations 
between the three parties (platform, lender and borrower), see 2.2 below. 
Litra c) above roughly relates to the inner layer of regulation that consists 
of the platforms’ self-regulation; since this layer most often reflects the 
two other layers by compliance considerations, the inner layer is included 
in 2.1 and 2.2 below. The case of TrustBuddy AB will be elaborated on 
later.  
2.1. PUBLIC LAW – THE PLATFORM 
Since the way in which the platforms are set up varies, it has to be 
specifically assessed in each case to which extent the platform needs to 
comply with the legislation. Some activities may need an authorisation 
and others may not. Below are some of the major areas dealt with, where 
financial supervisory authorities are involved.  
2.1.1. EU AUTHORISATION 
As a first step for fostering cross border crowdfunding activities 
and thus enhance the operation of the Single Market, P2P platforms as 
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crowdfunding service providers16 will with the proposed regulation be 
given the option to apply for a single Union-wide authorisation and 
supervision by a single authority, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). This provides a one-stop-shop access to the EU 
market, where the platforms can exercise their activities under uniform 
requirements as outlined in the proposal, see e.g. the proposal Preamble 
7 and Explanatory Memorandum 5. The requirements focus on their 
ongoing supervision, operations, organisation, transparency and 
marketing communications as outlined in Art. 1.  
A platform can choose to provide or continue providing services 
on a domestic basis under applicable national law and the proposed 
regulation does thereby not replace national rules on crowdfunding 
where they exist. The regulation will only apply to legal persons, who 
choose to seek authorisation/are authorised in accordance with Art. 10, 
see art. 2(1)(c) e.c. Such EU authorisation covers both the provision of 
services in a single member state and on a cross-border basis. 
Authorisation under the applicable national rules is then withdrawn. 
Crowdfunding services that are provided by natural or legal persons that 
have been authorised as an investment firm in accordance with the 2nd 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) Art. 7 will also be 
exempted from the regulation, see the proposal Art. 2(2)(b), and shall 
seek an authorisation under the directive to provide investment-based 
cross-border crowdfunding services.17 
2.1.2. PAYMENT SERVICES 
Most often, the platform transfers the loan amount from the 
lender(s) to the borrower and later on interest and repayments from the 
borrower to the lender(s). A platform’s holding of clients’ funds and the 
provision of payment services require an authorisation in accordance 
with the 2nd Directive on Payment Services.18 These funds shall be 
safeguarded in accordance with the national provisions transposing the 
directive; in the proposal this is emphasised in Art. 9(3). The directive 
includes provisions on capital, supervision, good business practice, 
                                                        
16 The proposal regards the authorisation of crowdfunding service providers as defined in the 
proposal Art. 3(1)(a), which both includes investment-based and lending-based business 
models. In the following the word platform is used for crowdlending service providers 
that manage the P2P platforms. 
17 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU [2014] OJ L173/349.  
18 European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2366/EU of 25 November 2015 
on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ L337/35. 
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transparency of conditions and information requirements and other 
obligations in relation to the use of payment services. 
The mandatory authorisation requirement in the 2nd Directive on 
Payment Services cannot be satisfied by an authorisation as a 
crowdfunding service provider according to the proposal. In the 
proposal this is clarified in Art. 9, cf. Preamble 21. Therefore, platforms 
or third parties acting on their behalf shall in accordance with Art. 9(2) 
not hold clients’ funds or provide payment services, unless those funds 
are intended for the provision of payment services related to (here) P2P 
lending, and the platform or the third party acting on its behalf is a 
payment service provider as defined in the 2nd Directive on Payment 
Services Art. 4(11). If this is not the case, the platform shall put in place 
and maintain arrangements to ensure that the project owners accept 
funding offers or any payment only by means of a payment service 
provider, see the proposal Art. 9(4).  
In order to enable a proper supervision of such activities, platforms 
shall in accordance to the proposal Art. 9(1) inform their clients: 
whether, and on which terms and conditions they or a third party, 
provide asset safekeeping services, including references to applicable 
national law; and whether payment services and the holding and 
safeguarding of funds are provided by the platform or through a third 
party provider acting on their behalf. 
National competent authorities shall according to the proposal Art. 
13(2)(a) notify ESMA without delay the fact that a platform, or a third 
party provider acting on behalf of that platform, has lost its authorisation 
as a payment institution in accordance with the 2nd Directive on Payment 
Services Art. 13. ESMA shall then withdraw the platform’s authorisation 
as a crowdfunding service provider, where ESMA is of the opinion that 
the facts affect the good repute of the management of the platform, or 
indicate a failure of the governance arrangements, internal control 
mechanisms or procedures referred to in Art. 5, see the proposal Art. 
13(3). This wide discretion seems narrowed by the detailed 2nd Directive 
on Payment Services. The national competent authority of the member 
state is then notified of ESMA’s decision to withdraw the authorisation 
of the platforms; see the proposal Art. 13(4). 
2.1.3. ADDITIONAL LICENCES – BANKING  
Since a P2P platform most often only transfers the payments, it 
does not need more than the mandatory authorisation requirement in the 
2nd Directive on Payment Services. However, the platform operator may 
in some member states for example need a permit under the general 
industrial law, which is the case in the German Industrial Act, § 34 c 
Abs. 1 1. Satz Nr. 2 Gewerbeordnung, GewO. The platform may also be 
set up in ways that demand additional requirements. A platform may for 
example need to have a license as a mortgage trading company, if it deals 
with real estate loans. This is the case for the Danish Udenombanken, 
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which therefore is more strictly regulated than other Danish platforms. 
Yet, the question that has got most attention is whether a platform 
engages in banking activities or not. For an investor, the question is of 
great importance, since the investment is only covered in accordance 
with the directives on deposit guarantee and investor-compensation 
schemes, if it is a licensed banking activity.19 
P2P lending is traditionally defined in contrast to banking. Whereas 
a commercial bank accumulates risks by taking positions on its balance 
sheet, a platform does not take risks through its own contractual 
positions, but decentralises the risks by spreading them to its users.20 As 
suggested, this is not the case if the platform engages in banking 
activities. A platform needs a license as a bank, if it takes deposits or 
other repayable funds from the public and grants credits for its own 
account, cf. the definition of a credit institution in the Credit 
Requirements Regulation Art. 4(1)(1), see the 4th Credit Requirements 
Directive Art. 3(1)(1).21 According to the 4th Credit Requirements 
Directive Art. 9 member states shall prohibit persons or undertakings 
that are not credit institutions from carrying out the business of taking 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public.  
Taking the interpretation of the Danish FSA, Finanstilsynet, into 
account, a P2P platform will normally not be covered by the rules, if 
separate accounts in banks are created, where it has no rights of 
disposal.22 When the lender pays out the loan amount, the intention 
should also be to create a binding loan agreement and not to have the 
amount returned in its whole.23  
In 2007, the former Belgian FSA, the Banking, Finance and 
Insurance Commission, Commission Bancaire, Financière et des 
Assurances, CBFA, concluded in a concrete project that the platform 
would only receive funds as an agent of the borrower and the lender and 
would not use these funds for its own account. The Belgian banking 
monopoly was not violated, since: ‘The platform was prepared (i) to 
transfer the funds to the account of the beneficiary on the same bank 
working day they were received; (ii) to ask a recognized accountant to 
                                                        
19 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/49/EU of 16 April 2014 on 
deposit guarantee schemes [2014] OJ L 173/149, and European Parliament and 
Council Directive 97/9/EC of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation 
schemes [1997] OJ L 84/22. 
20 Lenz (n 4) 688. 
21 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR) [2013] OJ L 
179/1 and European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms [2013] OJ L 179/338. 
22 Finanstilsynet, note of 4 July 2012. 
23 Søren Brinkmann and Allan Nielsen, ‘Crowdfunding. En ny andelsbevægelse’ [2014] 
8 RR 56, 62.  
NJCL 2018/1 
 
241 
certify the efficiency of this modus operandi and (iii) to send a copy of 
this certification to the CBFA’.24 
To the best of the present author’s knowledge, there have been two 
cases, where a platform has been sanctioned by a national FSA: 
The Austrian FSA, Österreiche Finanzmarktaufsicht, instructed by 
administrative decision dated 22 December 2009 the club Nick2Nick to 
stop its platform bankless-life.at, since the platform did not possess any 
licence pursuant to the Austrian Banking Act, § 4 Abs. 7 1. Satz 
Bankwesengesetz (BWG), and did not cooperate with a licenced credit 
institute.25 Members of the club used the platform for the procurement 
of private credits, and the club operated an illicit banking business by 
neither possessing a permit to accept deposits nor to grant credits or, 
respectively, procure credits.26 Furthermore, it was not entitled to 
perform payment services pursuant to the Austrian Payment Act, § 64 
Abs. 9 1. Satz Zahlungsdienstegesetz (ZaDiG) and lacked a permit under 
the industrial trade law to mediate private or mortgage credits.27 
On 23 June 2014 the Danish FSA decided that TrustBuddy AB – 
which was established in 2009 as a listed company in Sweden with 
businesses among others in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Spain 
and Poland – had to comply with the Danish Financial Business Act, lov 
om finansiel virksomhed § 7, stk. 1, and therefore needed to be licensed 
as a bank.28 At TrustBuddy’s webpage persons and companies could 
create profiles called accounts to use the services that TrustBuddy 
offered; among others it was explained to the lenders that their accounts 
were viewed as normal deposit accounts, but with higher interests. The 
amounts transferred to TrustBuddy by the lenders were actually put into 
an account in a bank in TrustBuddy’s name in each country it operated 
within. TrustBuddy had unrestricted rights to the bank accounts. The 
lenders did not have any influence on how the money was managed, and 
who the borrowers were. They could only claim their deposit from 
TrustBuddy and not directly from the borrowers; it was emphasised by 
the fact that the lenders’ names were not part of the credit agreements. 
The FSA found that this was not credit intermediation, and the lenders 
were in reality investors. Among others the FSA also found the validity 
                                                        
24 CBFA, Verslag van het directiecomit [2007] 81, 82: 
https://www.nbb.be/doc/cp/nl/publications/ver/pdf/cbfa_dc_2007.pdf, as 
described by Veerle Colaert, ‘On the absence of peer-to-peer lending in Belgium’ [2016] 
4 EuCML 182, 183. 
25 www.fma.gv.at/fma-untersagt-den-betrieb-der-kreditvermittlungsplattform-bankless-
life-at. 
26 www.bankless-life.at. 
27 www.fma.gv.at/verein-nick2nick. See also Nicolas Raschauer and Thomas Müller, 
‘Peer-to-peer lending in Austria’ [2016] 5 EuCML 222, 223. 
28 www.finanstilsynet.dk/~/media/Lovgivning/Regler-og-praksis/2014/20140625--
Afgrelse-over-for-TrustBuddy-AB-version-til-offentliggrelse.pdf?la=da. 
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of the contracts doubtful, where TrustBuddy got unrestricted rights and 
monitoring possibilities, while the investors still bore the credit risk.  
Afterwards, TrustBuddy put a stop to deposits from Danes, and 
Swedish depositors funded loans to the Danes. After an injunction from 
the Swedish FSA, Finansinspektionen, the platform was closed in 
October 2015. Partly without approval of the lenders, TrustBuddy had 
lend SEK 300m €31.92m) out. SEK 37m (€3,94m) had been lent out 
with no specification of which depositors the money came from. SEK 
44m (€4.68m) were missing, which was the difference between the 
available balance on the customer accounts and the amount TrustBuddy 
owed to the depositors.29 
The Danish case of TrustBuddy seems not only to have influenced the 
Danish market by lowering P2P consumer lending, but has also 
influenced other platforms. For example, the Danish platform Better 
Rates emphasises on its webpage that it is not a bank, but a payment 
service, and the wording seems to refer to the decision of the Danish 
FSA.30 
In Germany – as in the US – the “peer-to-peer” loans are in 
practice always raised through the conduit of a licensed bank, because 
only licensed banks are entitled to originate loans.31 The making of loans 
requires a license by the German FSA, Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin, if the lender acts ‘commercially’ or 
‘on a scale which requires a commercially set-up business operation’ 
according to the German Banking Act, § 32 Abs. 1 in connection with § 
1 Abs. 1 2. Satz Nr. 2 Kreditwesengesetz, KWG. In practice, BaFin 
interprets the notion of commercial activity in a broad manner and holds 
it to be sufficient that the lender intends to be active over a certain 
period of time and has the intent to make profits; a single transaction 
may be enough, if only the lender envisages further transactions.32 Also, 
the taking of deposits, which is whenever an individual or institution 
receives external funds from the public, constitutes a regulated banking 
activity according to KWG, see the same provisions above. The BaFin 
assumes that lending on P2P platforms is a regulated taking of deposits, 
if an individual or institution accepts funds from six or more investments 
and with a total volume of more than €12.500 or from more than 25 
investments irrespective of the volume of the transaction. The BaFin will 
not treat funds as “external”, if the loans are structured as subordinated 
debt; yet, a platform still would need a bank licence to originate loans.33 
                                                        
29 Tanja Jørgensen, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in Denmark’ [2016] 4 EuCML 185, 185-186, 
for elaboration of the case in a Danish context. 
30 www.betterrates.dk. 
31 Lenz (n 4) 692. 
32 BaFin, Merkblatt zum Tatbestand des Kreditgeschäfts, 8 January 2009, updated 2 
May 2016, and Renner (n 4) 224-225. 
33 BaFin, Merkblatt zum Tatbestand des Einlagengeschäfts, 11 March 2014, sub V, and 
Renner (n 4) 225. 
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In Germany, licensed banks therefore both do the payment service 
and originate the loans, which means that they intermediate between 
both market sides by making the initial loan to individual borrowers and 
then passing on the credit risk to individual lenders.34 The platform users 
are normally not aware of the involvement of banks, and the banks are 
called white-label banks, as their names do not appear. The use of banks 
makes it more expensive for platforms, as banks request a fee of 0.5% to 
1.5% of the loan amount.35 The German market may thereby imply legal 
challenges for the specific platform that wants to engage in cross boarder 
activities and in general be an obstacle for the growth of a European 
internal P2P lending market. 
However, different implementations in the member states as well 
as interpretations by national FSAs may be an obstacle, too. For 
example, the absence of peer-to-peer lending in Belgium may be 
explained by the Belgian extensive implementation of the 4th Credit 
Requirements Directive Art. 9, which does not use the words ‘carrying 
out the business of’. Any deposit-taking activity by persons other than 
credit institutions is therefore – irrespective of whether this is a business 
activity – prohibited in Belgium. A candidate-borrower on a P2P-
platform would be considered to make an ‘appeal to the public’ in order 
to receive repayable funds and therefore to violate the banking 
monopoly. Only legal persons, as P2P borrowers may fall under an 
exemption in the Belgian Prospectus Act, 68bis, 6o, which uses a very 
wide definition of ‘investment instrument’, including any ‘standardized 
loan document of which the content is identical for all lenders, except 
for the amount in principal, which may vary’.36 
Other challenges that platforms may encounter in relation to 
banking monopoly are related to the platforms’ competition against 
banks. When for example the Danish platforms are asked if they face any 
challenges, they reply that banks may in their basis capital include equity 
investments in data centres, which is not offered to payment institutions 
by the Danish FSA. Another challenge may be that, when banks lend to 
SMEs, they can achieve guarantee from the Danish Growth Fund, 
Vækstfonden, which is a state investment fund, but platforms cannot.37 
Being a licensed bank may therefore have certain benefits for a platform. 
Hence, in November 2016, the UK platform Zopa announced that it 
would apply for a banking license. Zopa’s digital bank is scheduled to 
launch in 2018 and will use data accessed by introducing open banking. 
                                                        
34 Ibid 224 and Lenz (n 4) 692. 
35 Lenz (n 4) 692. 
36 Colaert (n 24) 183. 
37 Jørgensen, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in Denmark’ (n 29) 187. 
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It will offer customers a broader set of personal finance products 
including deposit accounts, credit cards and a money management app.38  
2.1.4. MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING  
As any other financial service, P2P lending may be exposed to 
money laundering and terrorism financing practices. This is emphasized 
in the Commission’s Report on the assessment of the risks of money 
laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and 
relating to cross-border situations.39 When funding transactions must 
take place via entities that are authorised under the 2nd Directive on 
Payment Services they are subject to the 4th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive.40 Such entity authorisation under the 2nd Directive on Payment 
Services is mandatory for platforms under the proposal, see the proposal 
Art. 9. As part of the Know Your Customer-principle in the 4th Anti-
Money Laundering Directive, the platform shall obtain information 
about the costumer. Since P2P lending is web-based there is stricter 
requirements for documentation than attendance in person. When the 
platforms are asked, one of the challenges is that the national competent 
authorities may have slightly different demands when the 4th Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive is interpreted; for example the Danish FSA may 
have stricter demands to identification of the customer than the Swedish 
FSA, which accepts digital signature.41  
For platforms under the proposal, the requirements for the ‘good 
repute’ of managers include in Art. 10 the absence of any criminal record 
under anti-money laundering legislation. According to the proposal Art. 
13(2)(b) national competent authorities shall notify ESMA without delay 
about the fact that a platform, or its managers, employees or third parties 
acting on its behalf, have breached national provisions implementing the 
4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive. This also applies to national 
competent authorities designated under the provisions of the directive. 
ESMA shall then withdraw the authorisation as persuant to the proposal 
Art. 13(3), see 2.2.1 above, where the details in regard of payment 
services also apply to money laundering or terrorism financing.  
                                                        
38 AltFi Opinion, ‘Zopa boss Janardana details plans for customer-centric bank’: 
http://www.altfi.com/article/3116_zopa_boss_janardana_sheds_light_on_customer_c
entric_bank. Retrieved 31 May 2018. 
39 COM(2017) 340 final, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing 
affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities. 
40 European Parliament and Council Directive 2015/849/EU of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L 
141/73. 
41 Jørgensen, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in Denmark’ (n 29) 187. 
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With a view to further ensuring financial stability by preventing 
risks of money laundering and terrorism financing, the Commission 
shall, after consulting ESMA, assess the necessity and proportionality of 
subjecting platforms to obligations for compliance with the national 
provisions implementing the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive and 
adding such platforms to the list of obliged entities for the purposes of 
the directive, see the proposal Art. 38(2)(g) and Preamble 24. This will – 
24 months of entry into application of the proposed regulation – be 
presented in a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of this regulation, accompanied where appropriate by a 
legislative proposal.  
2.2. PRIVATE LAW – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
The relationship between the various parties structures the legal 
conflicts in a private law context. As in other types of crowdfunding, 
generally three types of parties are involved in P2P lending. The 
intermediary in the form of a service provider that brings together project 
owners and investors through an online platform, cf. the proposal 
Preamble 3. The project owner that seeks an activity or more activities (the 
project) to be funded, cf. the proposal Art. 3(1)(f). The investors who fund 
the proposed project, cf. the proposal Art. 3(1)(g) on investors and Art. 
3(1)(h) on business projects. Dealing with P2P lending, the project 
owner and investors respectively are synonyms for the borrower and the 
lenders, who fund the project with loans, and the word used depends on 
the context.  
Legal conflicts may arise from any stage of the (potential) project as 
from setting up and marketing the project to the completion of the 
project by the project owner’s final repayment or to the events of 
default. A platform’s disruptive business model can often be conceived 
of the following process:42 1) The potential borrower makes an inquiry to 
the platform indicating amount and maturity of the wished loan. 2) The 
platform assesses the underlying credit risk and sets a risk-appropriate 
interest rate, if the platform finds the risk acceptable. 3) The platform 
publishes the project to its users, if the borrower agrees with the 
platform’s terms, including pricing. 4) Potential lenders have a 
predefined period, often two or four weeks, in which to place their 
offers to provide portions of the required loan amount. The remaining 
amount needed is visible for the platform users. The users have to sign a 
service contract with the platform and complete a due diligence process 
to comply with the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive to gain access 
to the platform. 5) The loan is originated, if the sum of investment offers 
matches the required loan amount. The platform collects the money 
from the lenders’ bank accounts and transfers it to the borrower. The 
transfers of cash and credit claims are done concurrently as 
                                                        
42 For the following process, see Lenz (n 4) 691-692. 
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counterclaims, after deduction of platform fees from the borrower and 
lenders for their matching. The lenders receive a credit claim 
documenting the borrower’s legal commitment to pay interest and to 
redeem the principal. 6) Until the loan matures, the platform services the 
loan, collecting and distributing interest and redemption payments. The 
lenders carry the losses, if the borrower defaults. Even though the 
platform is not liable for losses, it is often obliged to manage missed 
payments. 
During this process, the platforms most often charge fees for their 
services. For example, the platform Zopa charge an origination fee to help 
cover the cost of setting up the loan, a loan servicing fee to each loan 
contract, which is deducted directly from each borrower repayment 
before the principal and interest is passed on to investors, and a 1% 
fee, if an investor wants to sell their loans to access their money quickly. 
2.2.1. SYNDICATED LOANS – A PARALLEL  
Both P2P lending and syndicated loans are generally characterized 
by more lenders contributing to the total loan amount of a borrower, 
and an intermediary that sets up and manages the loan contracts. These 
similarities may contribute to how the legal conflicts in regard to P2P 
lending may be solved by a national court. 
As an intermediary, the P2P platform shares the same coordinating 
function as the lead bank, which facilitates the establishment of the 
syndicated loan agreement, and the agent bank which often is the same 
bank as the lead bank and afterwards administers the loan and the 
repayment (interest, amortization, notifications etc.).43 Even though the 
functions and structures are much the same, P2P-lending has a digital 
set-up and often has another focus than syndicated loans. In syndicated 
loans the lenders and the intermediary are traditionally banks, and the 
borrower – e.g. large enterprises – often uses the loan amount to large 
and/or risky projects, where capital requirements may hinder one bank 
from granting the whole amount. In P2P lending banks are traditionally 
not parties but instead considered an opposition to banking. Yet, this is 
not without exemptions as noted in point 2.1.3 above and underlined by 
the fact that banks may be institutional investors. The loan amounts are 
most often smaller than in syndicated loans and used for other purposes 
as the borrowers are e.g. SMEs or consumers. The most important 
difference is that all the platforms interfaces with borrowers, lenders and 
payment service providers have to be fully standardized and automated 
by using software.44 Having this in mind, parallels to syndicated loans will 
be included in the following. 
                                                        
43 Lars Gorton and Tanja Jørgensen, ‘Roles and functions of the lead bank and the 
agent bank in a syndicated loan agreement’ [2009] 1 Euredia 33, 43, 51-52. 
44 Lenz (n 4) 693. 
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2.2.2. THE LEGISLATION  
The relationship between the parties is regulated by the contracts. 
National rules and principles in contract law and agency will therefore as 
background law define the relationship between the platform and the 
borrower and the lenders. Further, consumers may enjoy specific 
protection in national law, which often is quite similar, since the member 
states have implemented the EU consumer directives such as the 
Consumer Credit Directive (2.2.3 below), the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Directive. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive protects amongst 
others consumers against aggressive marketing techniques. The Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive ensures among others that 
unfair terms in standard contracts are not binding in the member states 
and includes a non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as 
unfair.45 When borrowers and lenders create a mandatory ‘client account’ 
at the platform, the platform’s standard terms are accepted. In the 
member states there are not many cases in this regard, as P2P lending is 
still a quite new phenomenon. The Polish Court of Competition and 
Consumer Protection, Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów, made 
decisions on unfair terms and conditions of the platform finansowo.pl. 
in three cases, which were brought forward by the consumer association 
Towarzystwo Lexus. The clauses concerned the unlimited possibility to 
amend the terms and conditions, the user exclusively carrying costs and 
risks connected with using the platform and the exclusion of the 
platform’s liability in case of technical problems when using the 
platform. The clauses which were held to be unfair were: ‘Finansowo.pl 
reserves the right to amend this regulation at any time’ in the judgment of 
22 June 2010, ‘Use of the service finansowo.pl is possible only and 
exclusively at the User’s own risk and expense’ in the judgment 22 June 
2010 and ‘Finansowo.pl shall not be liable for any damages resulting by 
service suspension, system or technical failures’ in the judgment 22 June 
2010.46 In the case of TrustBuddy, the Danish FSA in its decision of 23 June 
2014 (2.1.3 above) found the validity of the contracts doubtful, where 
TrustBuddy got unrestricted rights and monitoring possibilities, but the 
credit risk still was the investors; however, this is not a civil court 
judgement.  
                                                        
45 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29 and European Parliament and Council Directive 
2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [2005] L 149/22. 
46 Case XVII Amc 10/10, MSiG 2010/203/12669, case XVII Amc 9/10 MSiG 
2010/203/12678 and case XVII Amc 8/10 MSiG 2010/203/12668. The cases are 
described by Joanna Rupa, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in Poland’ [2016] 5 EuCML 226, 227. 
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The emergence of P2P platforms has given private individuals a 
whole new possibility to lend to each other. It questions whether the 
traditional consumer protection in only business-to-consumer (b2c) 
relationships is sufficient. The question is dealt with below in 2.2.3, 
where the result also relates to other consumer directives.  
2.2.3. CONSUMER CREDIT – THE BORROWER AND THE 
PLATFORM/INVESTORS  
In the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(a), a consumer means ‘a 
natural person who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is acting 
for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession’. The 
regulation proposed will not apply to crowdfunding services that are 
provided to project owners that are such consumers, since the regulation 
aims to foster cross-border business funding, see the proposal Art. 
2(2)(a) and Preamble 8. Instead, the protection in Consumer Credit 
Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive are considered as more 
strict rules to safeguard consumers than the proposal, see the proposal 
Explanatory Memorandum 1.47  
The Mortgage Credit Directive Art. 4(1) uses the Consumer Credit 
Directive Art. 3(a) consumer definition. The Mortgage Credit Directive 
applies according to its Art. 3(1) specifically for: (a) credit agreements 
which are secured either by a mortgage or by another comparable 
security commonly used in a member state on residential immovable 
property or secured by a right related to residential immovable property; 
and (b) credit agreements which purpose is to acquire or retain property 
rights in land or in an existing or projected building. These credit 
agreements are exempted from the Consumer Credit Directive, see this 
directive Art. 2(2)(a) and (b).  
Even though the specific rules differ, the Consumer Credit 
Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive seek to protect consumers 
with the aim to create an internal consumer credit market. However, as 
P2P borrowers, consumers may not always enjoy the demanded 
protection.  
The Consumer Credit Directive only applies; when the creditor is ‘a 
natural or legal person who grants or promises to grant credit in the 
course of his trade, business or profession’, see Art. 3(b) cf. the scope in 
Art. 2(1) and the definition of a ‘credit agreement’ in Art. 3(c). The same 
is the case in the Mortgage Credit Directive Art. 4(2) for an agreement 
within the scope of the directive, see Art. 3.  
This demand for a b2c relationship raises two main questions in 
regard to P2P lending:  
                                                        
47 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/17/EU of 4 February 2014 on 
credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and 
amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 60/34. 
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Is a private individual as a P2P lender granting ‘credit in the course 
of his trade, business or profession’ and thereby a ‘creditor’ as defined in 
the Consumer Credit Directive? It can be argued that a private individual 
as a P2P lender does not fit the directive Art. 3(b) definition of a 
creditor. According to the Belgian scholarly debate, the Belgian rules on 
consumer credit, which refers to the wording of the directive, will not 
apply to P2P lenders, nor to the platform, and therefore create great risks 
of over indebtedness and abuse for P2P borrowers.48 Also in Poland 
such a loan agreement would be considered between two consumers, 
since the platform only offers the marketplace, where borrowers and 
lenders can find each other. 
The answer to the question will depend on the specific situation 
and is not quite clear. However, even though a private individual as a 
lender aims to make profit, it seems awkward to view it in ‘course of his 
trade, business or profession’ as long as the profit cannot be considered 
a salary to make a living of. The raison d’être of the b2c demand is that 
private individuals as lenders shall not be subject to the strict obligations 
of business lenders. Instead a P2P lender's investment can be viewed as 
an alternative to having the means placed in a deposit account.  
The consequence is that P2P lending, where the lender is a private 
individual cannot be qualified as consumer credit. This leads to 
significant risks of over indebtedness and abuse of inexperienced 
borrowers, as they do not necessarily enjoy the protection laid out in the 
EU consumer directives. Yet, national provisions may cover such 
lending anyway. According to the Danish Credit Agreement Act, 
kreditaftaleloven § 1, stk. 2, the Act also applies to credit agreements 
where the credit is granted by a not-professional person, if the agreement 
is concluded or disseminated on behalf of the lender by a professional 
person. It has another background than P2P lending and therefore has a 
wording that focuses on preventing circumvention of the Act.49  
To conclude, the consumer borrower will only be covered by the 
higher consumer protection in (here) the Consumer Credit Directive and 
the Mortgage Credit Directive, when the lender grants ‘credit in the 
course of his trade, business or profession’. In other situations, the 
general law such as on contracts and marketing will only cover the 
borrower. 
To which extent shall the platform fulfil the obligations in the Consumer Credit 
Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive? In other words: Is the platform a 
                                                        
48 Cf. from a Belgian context Colaert (n 24) 182 with references to David Raes, ‘Le peer 
to peer lending en droit belge – Espoir ou désespoir’ in Cahiers AEDBF/EVBFR 
Belgium (ed), Digital Finance/La finance numérique (Anthemis/Intersentia 2015) 83, 
100 and Sylvie Decoster and Clarisse Lewalle, ‘Le crowdfunding: réglementation 
applicable, enjeux et perspectives’ (2014) Revue Bancaire et Financière – Bank- en 
Financiewezen 455, 464 and 467. 
49 Tanja Jørgensen, ‘Kreditformidlere – nu i dansk ret’ [2011] ET 243, 244-245. 
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creditor or an intermediary regulated by the Consumer Credit Directive 
or the Mortgage Credit Directive? 
In Case C-311/15, TrustBuddy AB, the Finnish Supreme Court, 
Korkien oikeus, asked the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), the question of whether a P2P lending platform can be 
considered to be a ‘creditor’ under the Consumer Credit Directive, if it 
markets credit to consumers via the internet. However, the answer from 
the CJEU will remain unanswered. After TrustBuddy went into 
bankruptcy, the case was deleted from the court’s register. As the Danish 
FSA found that TrustBuddy conducted banking activity, see 2.1.3 above, 
the platform was likely in the specific case a creditor. The referred 
request for a preliminary ruling was: 
Is [the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(b)] to be 
interpreted as meaning that a trade is to be regarded as a 
creditor if it markets credit to consumers via the internet in 
the form of so-called peer-to-peer lending and exercises, as 
regards the consumers, the decision-making power generally 
appertaining to creditors with respect to the terms and 
conditions, the granting of credit and debt recovery, even 
though the funds for credits come from anonymous private 
individuals and are kept separate from the trader’s own funds? 
Since a platform normally within its business just facilitates the 
interaction between the parties, the general answer seems to be that a 
platform hardly ‘grants or promises to grant credit in the course of his 
trade, business or profession’ and seems thereby not to be a creditor as 
defined in the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(b). If the lender is a 
private individual, there is furthermore hardly any credit agreement in the 
b2c sense of the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(c) and the Mortgage 
Credit Directive Art. 4(3), and the situation thereby falls outside the 
scope of the directives.  
In case of a b2c relationship between the lender and the borrower, 
the Consumer Credit Directive or the Mortgage Credit Directive will 
apply, if the contract falls within the more detailed scope in the 
Consumer Credit Directive Art. 2 and the Mortgage Credit Directive Art. 
3. In this situation a platform seems to fall within the definition of a credit 
intermediary in the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 3(f) meaning ‘a natural 
or legal person who is not acting as a creditor and who, in the course of 
his trade, business or profession, for a fee, which may take a pecuniary 
form or any other agreed form of financial consideration: (i) presents or 
offers credit agreements to consumers; (ii) assists consumers by 
undertaking preparatory work in respect of credit agreements other than 
as referred to in (i); or (iii) concludes credit agreements with consumers 
on behalf of the creditor’. However, a platform that merely introduces a 
consumer to a creditor or credit intermediary will fall without the 
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Mortgage Credit Directive's definition of a credit intermediary. A credit 
intermediary in the directive's Art. 4(5) means: 
a natural or legal person who is not acting as a creditor 
or notary and not merely introducing, either directly or 
indirectly, a consumer to a creditor or credit intermediary, and 
who, in the course of his trade, business or profession, for 
remuneration, which may take a pecuniary form or any other 
agreed form of financial consideration: (a) presents or offers 
credit agreements to consumers; (b) assists consumers by 
undertaking preparatory work or other pre-contractual 
administration in respect of credit agreements other than as 
referred to in point (a); or (c) concludes credit agreements 
with consumers on behalf of the creditor. 
A platform will as a credit intermediary have to fulfil the specific 
obligations of credit intermediaries in the Consumer Credit Directive or the 
Mortgage Credit Directive. According to the Consumer Credit Directive 
Art. 21, a credit intermediary shall indicate the extent of his powers in 
advertising and documentation intended for consumers and indicate the 
intermediary’s service fee payable by the consumer and agreed between 
the consumer and the credit intermediary on paper or another durable 
medium before the conclusion of the credit agreement. In the Mortgage 
Credit Directive a credit intermediary shall fulfil the more extensive 
information requirements in Art. 15, and the requirement for 
establishment and supervision of credit intermediaries in chapter 11, 
including holding a professional indemnity insurance in Art. 29(2)(a) and 
entering into a register of admitted credit intermediaries led by a 
competent authority in their home member state in Art. 29(4).  
In the two-fold contracting structure of German P2P lending, the 
licensed bank fulfils the lenders potential obligations under §§ 491 et seq. 
BGB, and the platform as a loan broker only has to comply with residual 
duties of information.50 In other member states platforms will most 
often take on the obligations of the creditors, and many of the articles in 
the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive also 
apply to credit intermediaries.51 In the Consumer Credit Directive the 
obligations are mainly standard information to be included in advertising 
in Art. 4 and pre-contractual and contractual information, including the 
annual percentage rate of charge (APR), in Art. 5 and 10; the APR shall 
for example contain a platform's origination and loan servicing fees. In 
the Mortgage Credit Directive they are mainly the conduct of business 
obligations in Art. 7, the obligation to provide information free of charge 
to consumers in Art. 8, knowledge and competence requirements for 
                                                        
50 Renner (n 4) 224. 
51 For elaboration, see Tanja Jørgensen, ‘Kreditformidlere – fremtidige regler’ [2011] 
ET 256-258. 
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staff in Art. 9, standard information to be included in advertising in Art. 
11, general information in Art. 13, pre-contractual information in Art. 
14, adequate explanations in Art. 16 and standards for advisory services 
in Art. 22.  
The obligations raise legal challenges in at least two situations.  
Often unique users IDs are used to keep the privacy of the borrower 
and lender. However, before a consumer is bound by a credit agreement, 
the consumer shall know the identity and the geographical address of the 
creditor as well as, if applicable, the identity and geographical address of 
the credit intermediary involved, see the Consumer Credit Directive Art. 
5(1)(b) with reference to the Standard European Consumer Credit 
Information form set out in Annex II. This also applies to the credit 
agreement, see the directive Art. 10(2)(b). It is not in accordance with the 
pre-contractual information duty, when for example the platform Better 
Rates writes that it is first in the final loan agreement that the investors 
real names can be seen by the borrower according to the Danish 
Consumer Agreement Act, Kreditaftaleloven, as implements the 
directive.52 P2P lending thereby includes knowledge of the borrower’s 
need for finance to a wider audience than lending normally does.  
It is the creditor – here the P2P lender – that is subject to assessing 
the consumer’s credit worthiness both in the Consumer Credit Directive 
Art. 8 and the Mortgage Credit Directive Art. 18, which especially may 
prevent over indebtedness of the potential borrower. However, most 
platforms as intermediaries conduct their own assessment of the 
underlying credit risk and fit it in to the platform’s risk categories. P2P 
platforms may though accept higher risks than banks, and borrowers 
who are rejected by banks may therefore end up being accepted by P2P 
platforms.53 Reversely, this raises certain considerations in regard to the 
protection of the investor as creditor, see 2.2.4 below.  
2.2.4. INVESTOR PROTECTION – THE INVESTORS AND THE PLATFORM  
With the new digital platforms, private individuals have got an 
opportunity to lend money and make investments that they have not 
previously had. Both in P2P lending and syndicated loans, the lenders 
enjoy the advantages of severalty, including spreading of the risk, and 
there is thus some correlation between the loan amount and the number 
of lenders involved. For example, at the platform Auxmoney the 
minimum investment amount is €25. An investment of € 2,500 can 
therefore be split into 100 different loan projects to diversify the 
investment portfolio.  
P2P lending often requires a great deal of trust from the investors, 
which needs to be met with corresponding responsibility from the 
platforms. For example, to save time and not have to study each loan 
                                                        
52 www.BetterRates.dk. 
53 Lenz (n 4) 697. 
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project individually, Auxmoney has created a Portfolio Builder, which 
automatically invests in various loan projects. The investors thereby 
entrust their money to the platform's discretion without knowing 
precisely which projects they invest in. 
There are significant risks for investors innate in P2P lending, and 
inexperienced investors do not necessarily know the consequences. The 
investor often receives limited information about the borrower as well as 
about the platforms’ credit assessment methods, and furthermore, both 
platforms and borrowers have some incentive not to be too critical 
about the disclosure of risks. There is a natural conflict of interest 
between investor protection and the platform’s business model, where 
the platform generates its income through a fee that usually corresponds 
to a certain percentage of the transaction volume, which thereby 
provides a steady incentive for the platform to stimulate the platform’s 
transaction volume by exaggerating investment opportunities and profit 
chances, while playing down the risks of investment projects.54 This 
makes P2P lending even more risky. It is illustrated by the striking case of 
TrustBuddy above, where the investors lacked insight in the credit 
assessment, the risk was played down and where the platform 
furthermore had all the powers until the money was returned to the 
lenders. 
Despite of the risks, P2P lenders are to date not shielded by the EU 
directives on investor protection. Though, some member states require 
P2P platforms to get licensed and to operate under existing EU 
frameworks, such as the 2nd Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. Other 
member states have introduced national bespoke regimes on investor 
protection.  
In the Netherlands six key regulatory changes were introduced in 
2016: 1) investment limits so that lenders will be able to invest € 80.000 
per platform, 2) a crowdfunding investment test for lenders, 3) an active 
confirmation and cancellation option whereby the platform will offer a 
period of reflection for lenders to either confirm or cancel their 
investment with two options: the ‘active confirmation’ option that 
requires platforms to send an email requesting lenders to confirm their 
investment within 24 hours, where the investment is cancelled in the 
absence of a response, and the ‘active cancellation’ option, which is the 
reverse of this, and the lender is sent an email offering cancellation of 
their investment, and the investment is finalised, if the lender takes no 
action, 4) asset segregation, where the assets of the platform should be 
kept separate from the assets of the lender/borrower at all times as the 
investment transitions through the platform, 5) monitoring of exemption 
holders, when considering the competence of directors, and assessing 
corporate credit risk, including determining the repayment capacity of 
                                                        
54 Lenz (n 4) 696. 
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companies and implementation of systems to allow payments between 
lenders and borrowers to continue in case the platform temporarily or 
permanently should stop functioning, and 6) a semi-annual reporting 
obligation with the main purpose to monitor the market developments.55 
The proposal for a Regulation on European Crowdfunding Service 
Providers (ECSP) for Business, does not intend to interfere with national 
bespoke regimes or existing licenses, including those under the 2nd 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, the 2nd Directive on Payment 
Services or the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. It 
rather seeks to provide platforms with the option to apply for a single 
Union-wide authorisation to scale up their operations throughout the 
EU. In this regard, it also seeks to empower investors with the necessary 
information, including the information on the underlying risks and to 
support investors’ trust by requiring platforms to have the necessary 
safeguards in place to minimise risks materialising, see the proposal 
Explanatory Memorandum 1. 
The proposal also covers private individuals as investors, since an 
‘investor’ according to Art. 3(1)(g) means ‘any person that, through a 
crowdfunding platform, grants loans or acquires transferable securities’. 
The provisions on investor protection and transparency set out in the 
proposal Chapter IV are quite extensive. 
Pursuant to Art. 14, all information, including marketing 
communications, from the platform to clients about themselves, about 
the costs and charges, conditions, including project selection criteria, or 
about the nature of and risks associated with the services shall be clear, 
comprehensible, complete and correct. It shall be provided to potential 
clients, before they enter into a transaction and be available on a clearly 
identified section of the platform’s website and in a non-discriminatory 
manner. 
Art. 15 sets out an initial assessment of appropriateness of a prospective 
investor, which is quite similar to the test in the 2nd Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive and to the crowdfunding investment test for 
lenders, which has been devised in the Netherlands in 2016.56 For the 
purposes of the assessment, the platforms shall request information 
about the prospective investor’s basic knowledge and understanding of 
risk in investing in general and in the types of investments offered on the 
crowdfunding platform, including specific information on past 
investments and any relevant knowledge or professional experience in 
relation to crowdfunding investments. Where a prospective investor 
                                                        
55 Matthew Williams, ‘Peer-to-peer lending in the Netherlands’ [2016] 4 EuCML 188, 
190. The regulatory changes was introduced via the revised Decree on the Supervision 
of the Conduct of Financial Enterprises, Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële 
ondernemingen Wft, and a change in supervisory policy on behalf of the FSA, 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten. 
56 id. 
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does not provide the information required, or where a platform on the 
basis of this information considers that the prospective investor has 
insufficient knowledge, the platform shall inform this prospective 
investor that the services offered on the platform may be inappropriate 
and give a risk warning. Platforms shall take the measures necessary to 
comply with the assessment of appropriateness for each investor every 
two years. 
Furthermore, Art. 15(5) provides that platforms shall offer 
investors the possibility to simulate their ability to bear losses, calculated as 
10% of their net worth, based on specific information dealing with 
income, assets and financial commitments. 
A risk warning, the lack of requested information from the 
prospective investor or the results of the simulation will not prevent 
prospective investors and investors from investing in projects. 
The platform shall according to Art. 16 provide prospective 
investors with a key investment information sheet (KIIS) drawn up by the 
project owner for each crowdfunding offer. It shall contain the detailed 
information set out in the Annex to the proposal and an explanatory 
statement, appearing directly underneath the title of the key investment 
information sheet: 
This crowdfunding offer has been neither verified nor 
approved by ESMA or national competent authorities. 
The appropriateness of your education and knowledge have 
not been assessed before you were granted access to this 
investment. By making this investment, you assume full risk 
of taking this investment, including the risk of partial or entire 
loss of the money invested. 
It shall also contain this risk warning: 
Investment in this crowdfunding offer entails risks, 
including the risk of partial or entire loss of the money 
invested. Your investment is not covered by the deposit 
guarantee and investor compensation schemes established in 
accordance with [the directives on deposit guarantee and 
investor-compensation schemes] 
You may not receive any return on your investment. 
This is not a saving product and you should not invest more 
than 10% of your net wealth in crowdfunding projects. 
You may not be able to sell the investment instruments when 
you wish. 
There are strict requirements to the form of the KIIS. According to 
Art. 16(3) it shall not only be ‘clear, comprehensible, complete and 
correct’ and not contain any footnotes other than law references, it shall 
LEGAL CHALLENGES OF P2P LENDING 256 
also be presented in a stand-alone, durable medium which consists of 
maximum 6 sides of A4-sized paper format if printed and be ‘clearly 
distinguishable from marketing communications’. On the other hand, all 
marketing communications to investors shall be clearly identifiable as 
such, and national competent authorities shall publish and keep updated 
on their websites national laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
applicable to marketing communications of platforms, see Art. 19(1) and 
Art. 20. 
The platform shall keep KIIS updated for the whole period of 
validity of the offer, see Art. 16(4). When a platform identifies a material 
omission, a material mistake or a material inaccuracy, the project owner 
shall according to Art. 16(6) complement or amend that information in 
the KIIS. Where this is not possible, the platform must not make the 
crowdfunding offer or cancel the existing offer until the key investment 
information sheet complies with the requirements of this Article. 
According to Art. 16(1) and (7) KIIS shall be drafted in at least one 
of the official languages of the member states concerned or in a language 
customary in the sphere of international finance and an investor may 
request a platform to arrange for a translation of KIIS into a language of 
the investor’s choice. Where the platform does not provide the requested 
translation of KIIS, the platform shall clearly advise the investor to 
refrain from making the investment. 
Art. 17 deals with bulletin boards. Platforms that allow their investors 
to interact directly with each other to buy and sell loan agreements or 
transferable securities which were originally crowdfunded on their 
platforms shall according to section 1 inform their clients that they do 
not operate a trading system and that such buying and selling activity on 
their platforms is at the client’s own discretion and responsibility. If the 
platforms suggest a reference price for the buying and selling, they shall 
inform their clients that this price is non-binding and substantiate it, see 
section 2. An example of such a bulletin board, is the platform Zopa. 
Here it is possible for the investors to sell active loans to other investors 
in the market. There is a 1% fee and a market rate adjustment 
fee associated with this service, which is available while the loans are up to 
date with repayments and there are other investors looking to buy the 
loans.57 
Art. 18 gives the right for the investor to access the records and 
demand that the platform for five years keeps all records related to their 
services and transactions on a durable medium and maintains all 
agreements between the platforms and their clients. 
                                                        
57 http://help.zopa.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2796228-are-there-any-fees-
associated-with-peer-to-peer-investments-at-zopa-. 
NJCL 2018/1 
 
257 
2.2.5. EXECUTION OF THE LOAN AGREEMENTS – THE INVESTORS AND 
THE BORROWER  
A P2P loan is often structured as a monthly annuity loan. It is 
contracted in the lender’s and borrower’s names and at their expense. 
The platform normally services the loan until the loan matures by 
collecting and distributing interest and redemption payments. The 
payment transactions are safeguarded in accordance with the national 
provisions transposing the 2nd Directive on Payment Services, see 2.1.2 
above. If the directives apply, a consumer borrower has a right to 
withdraw from a contract within 14 days according to the Consumer 
Credit Directive Art. 14 and a right to early repayment according to the 
Consumer Credit Directive Art. 16 or the Mortgage Credit Directive Art. 
25.  
The lenders carry the losses in the event of default. As a starting 
point, the platform is as not liable for losses, but may be held liable 
especially in cases of grossly behaviour, where for example the platform’s 
negligence or malpractice has caused the lenders losses. A typical 
situation could be risk assessment, where a platform conceals a known 
high-risk project to the lenders by categorising it as a low-risk project or 
exaggerating profit chances while playing down the risks of the project.  
In the event of default, more platforms manage missed payments. 
It could be a sale of non-performing loans on behalf of lenders to a debt 
collection agent for a fixed price to recover a minimum percentage of the 
credit claim or an automated litigation and recovery processes.58 For 
example the platform Better Rates helps in the event of default to send 
out reminders and to enforce the claim by civil courts. At the platform 
Zopa, a loan is classed as defaulted, if a borrower reaches four months’ 
worth of missed repayments. As a capital loss some of the original 
investment would be lost, and this amount would be deducted from the 
investor’s client account at Zopa, while Zopa tries to make recoveries on 
the loans. 
In case of the borrower’s bankruptcy, the investments are not covered 
by the deposit guarantee and investor compensation schemes, and the 
lenders will suffer losses. Yet, the lenders will be covered in the case of 
licensed banking, see 2.1.3 above. 
In the event of the platform’s bankruptcy, the lenders will still have 
their residual claims on the repayments with interest. Yet, asset 
segregation is of great importance to identify the claims. At all times of 
the transitions, the assets of the platform ought to be kept separate from 
the assets of the lender/borrower for example via a partnership with a 
licensed payment service provider or by creating a separate legal entity to 
manage the users’ assets. In the Netherlands there is a legal demand on 
platforms to secure asset segregation, see above.59 
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2.2.6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVESTORS 
There is hardly any relationship between the individual investors to 
a project. Each investor provides separately the funds to the borrower, 
even though the loan agreements are contracted on the same terms. The 
principle of severalty will apply as in syndicated loans.60 An investor is 
thus not responsible for the obligations of another by performing the 
loan amount to the borrower and the principle of joint and several 
liability in for example the Danish promissory note law, gældsbrevsloven 
§ 2, will not apply. However, something else may in rare situations have 
been contracted. 
The decision power when dealing with increased risks including 
upcoming default situations will as a starting point be the single 
investors, but unlikely syndicated loans investors have by contract 
entrusted the platform wide powers and there seems no need for joint 
decision as for example in a “peer-democracy” after drawdown. 
3. IS THE EXISTING LEGISLATION SUFFICIENT? 
P2P lending is a fairly new activity, but the intense growth in the 
last couple of years fuelled by new digital technologies indicates that it is 
only in its initial stage. As a starting point P2P platforms have to fit 
within the existing legislation. Yet, the existing legislation seems not 
quite sufficient to meet the impact that P2P lending may have on 
modern society.  
On the positive side, P2P lending has brought a new dimension to the 
financial market by giving access to new types of investments and new 
investors, such as private investors. Furthermore, it has given borrowers 
such as consumers and SMEs access to finance that may be on better 
terms and at lower costs; finance that they may not have been able to 
obtain elsewhere. Even though P2P lending often is conceived as a 
competition to banks, it may fill in the gap, where traditional banking can 
be considered inapt, while it has become more difficult to obtain credit 
in banks as a result of the financial crises and stricter capital 
requirements.61 On a European level, the platforms’ use of technology 
(FinTech) can elude factors as geographical proximity which creates 
barriers to the internal market. P2P lending may bring investors greater 
accessibility and ability to diversify risk with a more resilient and 
effective financial infrastructure as a result. It may even deliver a more 
inclusive financial system both domestically and globally.62  
Yet, also negative consequences of P2P lending are lurking in the form 
of new and different risks. The investor often receives limited 
information about the borrower as well as about the platforms’ credit 
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assessment methods, and furthermore both platforms and borrowers 
have some incentives not to be too critical concerning the disclosure of 
risks; a natural conflict of interest exists between investor protection and 
the platform’s business model.63 The borrowers’ poor credit history or 
lack of access to bank loans may add to the risk of losses for investors 
and the risk of overindebtedness of borrowers. Due to a divergence in 
the credit risk assessment, there might be an adverse selection process 
operating in which low-risk customers borrow from banks and high-risk 
customers use P2P platforms. Since P2P platforms may accept higher 
risks than banks, borrowers who are rejected by banks may therefore end 
up being accepted by P2P platforms.64  
While institutional investors may benefit from the new types of 
investments, the contrary may be the consequence for inexperienced 
private investors, which are unaware of the inherent risks. Yet, P2P 
lenders are to date not shielded by the EU directives on investor 
protection. The consumer borrower will likely only be covered by the 
higher consumer protection in especially the Consumer Credit Directive 
and the Mortgage Credit Directive, when the lender grants ‘credit in the 
course of his trade, business or profession’. Taking up a loan in a mixed 
P2P and B2P platform, the consumer borrower may be protected in one 
situation but not in another. 
From the platforms’ point of view, P2P lending requires significant 
software investments, and they are today met with different requirements 
throughout the EU. The necessary involvement of a credit institution in 
for example Germany makes it more expensive for platforms.65 
However, in a national context the platform “just” needs to be set up in 
the correct manner to meet the public law requirements by for example 
having a licence to offer payment services and not engaging in bank 
activities on its own.  
As a fairly new activity, only a small number of member states have 
introduced legislation on P2P lending, and most member states still seem 
to prefer a ‘wait-and-see’ approach.66 However, P2P lending is rapidly 
developing with great risks to borrowers and investors, which will call 
for action. To avoid legislative fragmentation by uncoordinated 
regulatory activities at the member state level that create new barriers to 
the emerging EU crowdfunding market, a dedicated, single European 
regulatory framework on crowdfunding, including P2P lending, will be a 
suitable solution.67 Expanding the European Commission’s proposal for 
a Regulation on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP) for 
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Business to a mandatory framework, which also covers consumer 
borrowing, could do it. Yet, such a framework is not likely in the near 
future, when the Commission states ‘[g]iven the predominantly local 
nature of crowdfunding, there is no strong case for EU level policy 
intervention’.68  
The most feasible way may therefore be to adjust today’s legislation 
– at which level it is possible – to a new digital reality, where the existing 
market structures are changing. One likely, suitable solution could for 
example be to include both P2P lenders and borrowers in the existing 
frameworks. To illustrate, in the context of the Consumer Credit 
Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive the protection of the 
consumer borrower could be clarified in situations, where the credit is 
granted by a private individual via an intermediary acting in the course of 
his trade, business or profession. 
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